Electoral rules and the political representation of ethnic minorities: evidence from Bulgaria and Romania by Spirova, Maria
AElectoral Rules and the Political 
Representation of Ethnic 
Minorities: Evidence from 
Bulgaria and Romania
MARIA SPIROVA
C P S   I N T E R N A T I O N A L   P O L I C Y   F E L L O W S H I P   P R O G R A M
2
0
0
3
/
2
0
0
4

CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE
MARIA SPIROVA
Electoral Rules and the Political
Representation of Ethnic
Minorities: Evidence from
Bulgaria and Romania
The views in this report are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Center for Policy Studies, Central European University or the Open Society Institute. We
have included the reports in the form they were submitted by the authors.  No additional
copyediting or typesetting has been done to them.
 1    
Electoral Rules and the Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities: 
Evidence from Bulgaria and Romania1     
Maria Spirova 
UW-Milwaukee 
spirova@uwm.edu
  
Paper Prepared for Presentation at the 2004 Annual meeting of the 
Association for the Study of Nationalities, April 15-17, 2004, Columbia 
University, New York..  
Abstract: The political integration of ethnic minorities is one of the most challenging 
tasks facing the countries of post-communist Europe. The roads to political 
representation in the mainstream political process are numerous and diverse. This 
paper focuses on one form of political representation of ethnic minorities  ethnic 
political parties and analyses the way in which the electoral arrangements in the 
region have encouraged or discouraged ethnic parties. It uses the experience of 
Bulgaria and Romania to examine in detail the relationship between electoral 
arrangements and success of ethnic parties, and the impact of the presence of ethnic 
parties on trends of political participation of minorities.  
The results of the analysis support the paper's argument that electoral arrangements 
are important but no key to achieving meaningful political representation. Electoral 
arrangements thus seem to matter, but to mostly do so in situations where other 
factors of political mobilization seem to make representation uncertain.  The effect of 
electoral arrangements on the success of ethnic parties is clearly mitigated by the size 
and dynamics of the minority they represent. However, there seems to be some link 
between the presence of ethnic parties in the political system and the level of political 
participation of the ethnic minority.  
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Introduction  
The debate over the proper form of minority rights in the post-communist 
world has intensified significantly over the last decade.2  There are two main factors 
that have contributed to this phenomenon: the past history of suppression of 
minorities in the region and the incorporation of the principle of minority protection 
into the political requirements for entry into the European Union.  
The representation of ethnic minorities in the political process is one of the 
components of minority protection. Minority representation can take various and 
diverse forms. Minorities can have their own representatives in the legislative 
institutions at both national and regional level; they can have minority experts in 
various consultative bodies to the government; alternatively, minorities can also be 
given a right to self-government. Achieving legislative representation can also be 
done in several ways  minorities can participate in the political process through non-
minority specific parties; they can try to form their own parties and achieve 
representation along ethnic lines. There are also various ways in which the state, 
through its political institutions and legislative framework can encourage or 
discourage the representation of its minorities. 
This paper investigates the relationship between one of the forms of ethnic 
political representations  ethnic parties  and one of the possible ways though which 
state policy can impact it  the type and nature of the electoral system.  Ethnic parties 
exist in virtually all Eastern European states. The legal and institutional frameworks 
                                                
2 For the purposes of this paper, the post-communist world includes the countries of Albania, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania. The other ex-Yugoslav 
republics are excluded because of the different nature of politics and ethnic relations there, as well as 
their relatively short experience with democratic institutions. However, in terms of ethnic make-up 
Croatia and Serbia & Montenegro are more similar to the states included in this study, than to the more 
ethnically heterogeneous states of Bosnia and Macedonia. The post-Soviet states are excluded for 
similar reasons.  
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of these countries, however, treat ethnic parties in several quite different ways.  
Albania and Bulgaria, for example, have banned ethnic parties. The Czech and Slovak 
Republics allow ethnic parties to exist and subject them to equal treatment by their 
electoral laws. Hungary and Poland not only permit ethnic parties to form and run in 
elections but also make it easier for them to gain representation at different levels of 
government. Finally, Romania and Slovenia provide the most extreme form of 
positive discrimination by providing guaranteed seats to minorities (subject to some 
limitations).  
The paper provides a comparison between two quite different forms of 
minority electoral arrangements -- these in Bulgaria and Romania -- and analyses the 
impact they have had on the success of ethnic parties in the two countries. It 
concentrates on the political parties of two Romanian minorities  the Hungarians and 
the Roma -- and on two Bulgarian ones  the Turks and the Roma.  The paper argues 
that the electoral arrangements have made a significant and consequential difference 
in the case of only one minority  that of the Roma in both countries. The larger 
minorities in both Romania and Bulgaria have done similarly well despite differences 
in the institutional constraints on their behavior.  
Finally, in an attempt to link institutional arrangements with the political 
behavior of individual members of minorities, the paper investigates whether the 
different electoral fate of Roma parties have had any impact on the levels of political 
participation of the Roma minorities in the two countries. For this purpose, the paper 
uses survey data from the UNDP Avoiding the Dependency Trap database.  
Minorities in Bulgaria and Romania 
Bulgaria and Romania are an appropriate set of countries for a comparative 
study because they have relatively comparable ethnic make-ups and similar history of 
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inter-ethnic relations. In addition, their experiences with democratic transition have 
been relatively alike.  
Table 1 presents some basic data on the ethnic situation in Bulgaria.   
[Table 1 About Here] 
The majority group constitutes about 84 % of the total population. The largest 
minority are the Turks, who make up about 9% of the total population, and are 
concentrated in three of the nine administrative regions of the country.  The second 
largest minority are the Roma(Gypsies) who constitute about 4.6% of the population 
according to official statistics, although Roma experts provide almost twice as big 
estimates of their number (CEDIME 1999). The Roma live in all areas of the country. 
The Russian, Armenian and Vlach minority each makes up less than 1% of the 
population of Bulgaria, and Macedonians, Greeks, Ukrainians, Jews, and Romanians, 
each constitute less than .1 % of the total population.  
The ethnic situation in Romania is roughly similar. Romanians constitute 
about 89% of the population in the country; there are two large minorities and several 
smaller ones. Table 2 presents the ethnic data for Romania. 
[Table 2 about here] 
The Hungarian minority, 6.6% of total population, is the largest one and is 
concentrated in several regions, similar to the Turks in Bulgaria (Alionescu 2003). 
The Roma of Romania are the most numerous Roma minority in Eastern Europe, but 
given the size of the total population of Romania, constitute only 2.5% of it, which 
makes them a smaller proportion than the Roma in Bulgaria. However, just as in the 
case of the Bulgarian Roma, experts estimate their population to be much bigger than 
official data -- around 1.8 million or 7.9 per cent of total population (CEDIME 2001). 
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Like Roma in Bulgaria and elsewhere, the Romanian Roma are scattered throughout 
the country. Germans, Ukrainians, Russians, Turks, Tatars and Serbs are minorities 
that make up less than 1% but more than .1 % of the population, and the smaller 
groups of Slovenes Slovaks, Bulgarians, Jews, Czechs, Poles, Greeks and Armenians 
constitute less than 0.1 of a percent each.  
The two countries have clear dominant majorities, a single, substantial and 
concentrated minority (Turks in Bulgaria and Hungarians in Romania), a substantial 
but scattered second minority (Roma) and a multitude of smaller ethnic groups with 
which this paper is only marginally concerned. The four minorities of interest have all 
established their own political parties, despite quite different institutional and political 
contexts in the two systems. In many ways, these arrangements reflect the two sides in 
the debate on the desirability of ethnic parties for democratic politics.   
The Debate on Ethnic Political Parties 
In Horowitz classic definition, an ethnically based party is a party that 
derives its support overwhelmingly from an identifiable ethnic group (or cluster of 
ethnic groups) and serves the interests of that group (Horowitz 2000, 291). An ethnic 
party does not have to be the exclusive party of that minority as minorities might split 
their political support among more than one political party.  It is the group s cohesion 
and division that determines how many parties emerge (Horowitz 2000, 293). 
However, for all ethnic parties, ethnicity becomes the principal source of support and 
they would try to find other sources of support only when they can do that at 
extremely low cost. Because of this, transforming an originally ethnic party into a 
multi ethnic one becomes extremely difficult (Horowitz 2000, 293). 
Donald Horowitz has made a strong argument against ethnic parties by 
maintaining that ethnic parties tend to divide a divided society even further. As they 
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often represent strictly group interests, they are unable to concern themselves with 
issues of national importance and their behavior is dangerous for the good 
government of the country (Horowitz 2000, 294). Other authors have similarly argued 
that because ethnic parties make their political appeal specifically on ethnicity, their 
emergence often has a centrifugal effect on politics (Reilly 2003). The resulting 
fragmentation of the party system has a detrimental effect on the stability of 
democracy and government in such situations. Reilly argues that states can make 
concerted efforts to encourage the initial development of multiethnic parties though 
their electoral and party legislation (Reilly 2003). 
Stephen Wolf has similarly argued against the acceptance of nationalist 
mobilization by sub-national groups as a normal and legitimate part of everyday 
politics in a free and democratic society  (Wolf 2002). Like Horowitz and Reilly, 
Wolf has called for the de-ethnicization of politics and has argued that it could be 
mandated through the electoral systems and party legislation.  
In contrast, other authors have argued that ethnic parties pose challenges to 
democratic government only in deeply divided societies. Stroschein, for example, has 
maintained that ethnic parties do not cause ethnic conflict, but reflect differences 
(cleavages) that already exist. However, they domesticate ethnic issues into 
institutional forms, thus allowing them to be resolved in parliament rather than 
through violence.  Ethnic parties, she maintains, usually play by the rules and have 
obtained some of their demands through the democratic process.  Conflicts between 
these and other parties are routinized and the political process allows the parties to 
find a way to bargain over heated issues and negotiate alternatives (Stroschein 
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2001, 61). Others have similarly attributed the preservation f ethnic peace in various 
settings to the representation of ethnic parties in Parliament (Petkova 20002, 52).  
If Stroschein and others base their arguments in support of ethnic parties on 
expediency, Will Kymlicka has gone even further to maintain that national 
mobilization by sub-national groups is a legitimate part of democratic politics.  
Although concerned with broader issues than just ethnic political parties, Kymlicka s 
argument for the introduction of various group-rights based solutions to the problems 
of ethnicity in the post-communist world, is based on the idea that politics is, and in 
some ways even should, be ethnically based. Kymlicka has argued that even 
secessionist parties need to be de-stigmatized as they are a legitimate expression of 
nation-building of minorities, something that a liberal-democratic nation-state needs 
to allow (Kymlicka 2001 and 2002).  
Electoral rules and minority representation 
A natural extension of any of these two positions is the legal and institutional 
framework which states impose on any political actors within them, including 
potential ethnic parties. Constitutional provisions and electoral legislation are the 
most common instruments of state policy that can influence the success or failure of 
ethnic parties. As the constitutional treatment is a prerequisite for any electoral 
treatment, they are discussed within the framework of the relationship between 
electoral rules and ethnic parties. For its discussion of the electoral treatment of 
minorities, this paper borrows from the analytical framework of Carlos Flores 
Juberias s discussion of electoral arrangements and national minorities in post-
communist Europe (Juberias 2000).  
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States that fear secessionist movements deeply, thus in a way reflecting the 
Horowitz side of the debate, can chose to ban ethnic parties from existence. Bulgaria 
and Albania are examples of systems in which ethnic based parties are banned in the 
Constitution or the Law on Parties and their activities are discouraged by the electoral 
laws (Juberias 2000, 37). Alternatively, legislation can mandate that parties need to be 
multi-ethnic in terms of their structures and membership, an especially useful practice 
in societies which are deeply divided among ethnic lines (Reilly 2003). 
Assuming that ethnic parties are not banned, the nature of the electoral laws 
can significantly influence the chance of success of failure of ethnic parties, without 
providing them with any special treatment. That electoral systems have an impact on 
who gets representation in the legislative bodies is a long standing law in political 
science. According to Duverger s original formulation, the relationship is pretty 
straightforward. In plurality SMD systems, only one candidate can win in each 
district; as a result, any third party suffers from extreme under-representation because 
of both elite and voters strategies. This disadvantageous seat-vote ratio prevents the 
party from gaining the representation that it deserves, and the exposure, government 
participation, public funding or any other benefits associated with winning. It is thus, 
in the longer run, discouraged from running and forced to either join one of the two 
dominant parties, or disband (Duverger 1955, 225-6).  
In contrast, proportional representation preserves the proportionality of votes 
and seats and thus, provides little or no reward for fusing and no punishment for 
splitting (Duverger 1953, 248-254). Although specifics of the PR system result in 
certain differences, and full proportional representation exists nowhere PR systems 
tend to have a multiplicative effect on the number of parties (Duverger 1958, 253). 
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An enormous amount of work has been done since to test, qualify, and revise 
the Duverger s formulae (Rae 1971, Grofman and Lijphart 1986, Cox 1997, Lijphart 
1991, 1994; Shvetsova and Ordershook 1994).  Some of it has directly related to issue 
of political representation of minorities, probably best represented by Lijphart theory 
of consociational democracy (Lijphart 1999). As proportional representation lowers 
the hurdles for smaller parties ethnic parties are more likely to gain representation in 
PR systems, this providing for peaceful resolution of ethnic issues and, ultimately for 
a higher support for the political system by the members of the minority (Lijphart 
1999, Norris 2004, ?).3 The underlying casual mechanism that provide for the benefits 
of consociationalism is thus based on the assumption that ethnic parties are present 
and active in the political system.  
Several features that distinguish electoral systems within the PR family are 
likely to influence the chances for success of ethnic parties. As ethnic parties are 
usually small, the nature and presence of a electoral threshold is probably the most 
important one.  Not only do higher thresholds hurt minorities, but thresholds set 
around the percentage point that reflects the minority proportion of the population 
also reduce the chances of the ethnic party. Similarly, when substantially raised 
thresholds apply to coalitions, minority parties are hurt especially as the vote is 
limited by the size of the minority (Juberias 2000, 35).  
In addition, electoral legislation can hurt ethnic parties not because they are 
small, but because their support is regionally bound. Electoral regulations can require 
parties that want to participate in elections to field candidates in a large portion of the 
                                                
3
 It has to be mentioned, however, that in cases when the ethnic minorities is highly concentrated in 
only several regions, SMD electoral systems can also benefit it. However, case like this are relatively 
rare (Norris 2004, ?) .  
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country while party laws might limit public funding to parties with certain number of 
candidates as well (Roper 2003, Ikstens et al 2002).  
Most of the Eastern European countries discussed here use proportional 
representation with thresholds of 4-5 % for individual parties. Romania, Slovakia, 
Poland and the Czech Republic have thresholdsof between 7 and 11 % for political 
coalitions. Hungary is the only country with a mixed electoral system, with a 5% 
threshold in its PR part.  Given the size of minorities in these countries, their 
representation in the political process is often challenged by these thresholds. This is 
probably why most of the countries in the region have had to incorporate special 
provisions for ethnic minorities in the electoral systems. 
The Czech and the Slovak Republics are the two countries of this group that 
do not specifically ban ethnic parties but apply their electoral systems neutrally to all 
parties (Juberias 2000, 36). Needless to say, given the homogenous nature of the 
population in the Czech Republic and the high threshold (5%) no ethnic party has ever 
managed to gain representation in the Czech Parliament. In Slovakia, the only 
minority party that has been represented in Parliament is the Hungarian minority party 
(MK) which is big enough to surpass the legal threshold of 5%. 
Electoral arrangements can provide for the positive discrimination of ethnic 
parties by easing their requirements specifically for minority parties. Systems might 
relax the requirements for fielding candidates, register candidates, and run national 
campaigns, and even ignore the electoral threshold in the case of minority parties 
(Juberias 2000, 38). Such measures have been introduced by Poland in its legislation 
mandating national elections and by Hungary by only in local elections. Through that 
system the party of the German minority in Poland which has gotten between 1.2% 
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and 0.4% of the total vote has been able to secure a proportional number of seats in 
the Polish Sejm.  
Finally, the most direct ways to ensure minority representation in the 
legislature is to provide minority parties or minorities as wholes with guaranteed 
representation in the national legislative body. Either groups officially recognized as 
minorities by the state, or any minority that runs a political party in elections can be 
granted these seats. Slovenia provides for the representation of two minorities that are 
constitutionally recognized as such,. Romania provides the strongest system of 
positive discrimination as it does not limit the number of minorities that can get 
representation (Juberias 2000, 44-49).  
Both positive and negative discrimination of minorities  banning their parties 
or granting them special privileges have been criticized by various democratic 
theorists. The former for not allowing a basic right to all of its citizens, and the latter 
for violating the equality of representation, one f the basic principles of democracy.  
Moreover, the impact of electoral arrangements is often not as clear cut as electoral 
engineers sometimes claim it is. A close examination of these electoral arrangements 
and their impact on the success or failure of ethnic parties is thus clearly necessary 
before any certain conclusions. 
Electoral Arrangements in Bulgaria and Romania: two extreme policy options 
Bulgaria and Romania represent the two extremes of the policy options 
discussed presently. Bulgaria has instituted the most restrictive form of institutional 
arrangements for ethnic parties by banning the existence of parties based on ethnic, 
racial and religious allegiance, thus obviously making any other electoral 
arrangements for minorities impossible. Romanian legislation guarantees one seat to a 
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legally constituted party of each and any minority (subject to certain restrictions), 
which is the most extreme form of positive discrimination in the whole region. 
The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria forbids the existence of ethnic 
political parties in article 11 (4) 
There shall be no political parties on ethnic, racial, or religious lines, 
nor parties which seek the violent usurpation of state power. 
(Bulgarian Constitution 1991)  
This restriction is in line with the general spirit of the Bulgarian constitution 
which avoids the mention of the word minority and does not provide for any 
collective rights (Vassilev 2001, 43). In general, Bulgarian political actors seem 
fearful of the association of the word national minority with secession and generally 
refuse to use word in public discourse, calling national minorities minority groups 
(CEDIME 1999 and 2001). Despite allegations by minority rights advocates that the 
constitutional ban of ethnic parties is discriminatory and violates international laws, 
there has been no discussion of amending the constitution in any relevant way (BHC, 
various years). 
The electoral system in Bulgaria is Proportional Representation with a 4% 
national threshold which treats political parties and coalitions identically. Public 
funding of political parties is provided for parliamentary parties only (Smilov 1999, 
IDEA 2004).  
In contrast, Romania not only allows ethnic parties, but has introduced special 
provisions to guarantee that they have a seat in Parliament. The electoral system used 
in Romania is Proportional Representation. Parties or political formations must obtain 
at least 5% of the national popular vote to gain parliamentary representation. In the 
case of political alliances, 3% of the validly expressed votes throughout the country is 
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added to the 5% threshold for the second member party; and an extra 1% is added for 
each other member of the alliance, beginning with the third one, up to a maximum 
electoral threshold of 10% (Law for the Election of the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate in Romania, 1992).  
Most importantly, however, legally constituted organizations of citizens 
belonging to a national minority, which have not obtained at least one Deputy seat 
through the general rules of the elections, have the right to a seat in Parliament. The 
only stipulation is that they must have obtained, at national level, at least 5% of the 
average number of the validly expressed votes needed for the elections of one Deputy 
according to the general rules of elections (Law for the Election of the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Senate, 1992). 
The Romanian system of positive discrimination of minorities is thus an 
extremely strong as it does not limit the number of minorities that can get 
representation. Through that system about fifteen minorities have, on average, gained 
representation in Parliament (Juberias 2000, 44-49). The broadness of the definition 
has been criticized for basically allocating the same status to minorities of various 
sizes and positions in society. 
The Bulgarian Ethnic Model  
The presence of a constitutional ban on ethnic parties, however, has not meant 
that no ethnic parties have been present in Bulgarian politics. De facto ethnic parties 
have managed to maintain a stable position in the political process by not openly 
registering as ethnic political entities. However, for most of the 1990s, this was only 
possible for the relatively numerous and powerful Turkish minority in Bulgaria.   
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The Turkish-dominated Movement of Right and Freedoms (DPS) was founded 
officially in early 1990. Although it does not have an openly stated ethnic platform 
and included ethnic Bulgarians in both its membership and its leadership, it represents 
the interests of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria and its support is concentrated 
heavily in the region populated by the minority. It gained a consistent share of the 
vote throughout the 1990s and has been present in all legislatures (Kumanov 1999: 
134). Its support was considered instrumental for the changes of governments during 
1991-1994. Since 2001 the DPS has been an official coalition partner in the Bulgarian 
government (Harper 2003, 339). 
[Table 3 About Here] 
The ability of the MRF to function freely in Bulgarian politics was challenged 
at numerous times in the early 1990s. By the late1990s, there was no major concern 
that the constitutional provision can prevent either the DPS or the fledgling Roma 
political parties from participating in the political process (Vassilev 2001).  
The DPS has thus been able to function well in Bulgarian political life despite 
the constitutional ban and the absence of special electoral treatment of ethnic parties 
in Bulgaria. Its substantial size, as well as the loyalty the DPS and its leader Ahmed 
Dogan have managed to cultivate in a big part of the minority have mainly 
contributed to this result.  
[Table 4 about Here] 
The DPS has a very high extent of encapsulation of its voters  measured as 
the ratio of its members to its voters; it is second only to the BSP in Bulgaria and way 
above any averages for non-ex communist parties in the region (van Biezen 2003). 
About 45% of the whole Turkish majority (including non-voters) voted for the DPS.  
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The DPS thus has not been hurt by the constitutional or the electoral 
arrangements in Bulgaria. The 4 % threshold has only once come close to posing a 
threat to the DPS; in the 1994 elections the party got a little over 5 % of the vote. As a 
result, the DPS formed a coalition with some other, non-ethnic parties in 1997 (ONS), 
although the DPS contributed most of the support for the coalition in the elections.  
The coalition did not last long and in the 2001 elections the DPS formed a new 
coalition with one liberal and one Roma party.  
However, as its deputy chairman indicated, the DPS realizes that it cannot 
expand its vote any more than it already has unless it reaches outside the Turkish 
minority (Dal 2003). Consequently, since 2001 then DPS has been making a 
conscious effort to transform itself into a liberal party: it has tried to include more 
ethnic Bulgarian is its leadership, and has joined the Liberal International. However, 
as Horowitz suggests, achieving this has proven extremely challenging because most 
Bulgarians do not associate the DPS with liberal values but with a strong commitment 
to defending the interests of the Turkish minority.  
The DPS itself and numerous commentators and analysts have praised the 
Bulgarian ethnic model as represented by the incorporation of the DPS in 
mainstream democratic politics, the moderation of the DPS policy positions over 
time, and its law-abiding behavior (Vassilev 2001, Tatarli 2003, Petkova 2002). The 
ethnic model has been seen as the major factor for the preservation of ethnic peace 
in the country, the respect of the civil and political rights of the Turkish minority, and 
for their relatively good economic well being. However, the Bulgarian ethnic model 
has excluded any other minority, a fact that has been painfully obvious in the situation 
of the Roma. 
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Roma parties have been unable to secure a stable place in Bulgarian politics. 
Several factors account for this. First, the initial registration of some Roma parties 
was not permitted based on the Constitutional ban of ethnic parties.  Second, the 
Roma minority is much more heterogeneous than the Turkish one, and is also 
scattered around the country. This makes it almost impossible for them to mobilize 
and support a single national party. Finally, the Bulgarian Roma represent just about 
4% of the population, equivalent to the threshold of the electoral system, making the 
success of an even well organized and unified Roma party doubtful.  
The Bulgarian Roma parties are not unique in this regard. As Stroschein has 
argued, to be successful an ethnic party must obtain a high percentage of votes from a 
finite political base  the groups that it represents (Stroschein 2001: 61) Ethnic parties 
thus require a lot of consensus minded politicians Achieving this is often an infeasible 
option for the diverse Roma communities and fragmentation has been a common 
feature of the Roma political organizations throughout Eastern Europe (Baranyi 2001, 
3). The absence of any electoral encouragement for the Roma parties in Bulgaria, 
however, has made their representation in Parliament  even less likely than in most 
other post-communist systems.  
The Roma in Bulgaria began to organize right after the democratic changes of 
1989. By mid 1990 they had formed the Democratic Union Roma (DUM), led by 
Manush Romanov.  The union, however, was denied registration as political party and 
could not compete in the immediate elections. In addition, the Union was plagued by 
disagreements about its ideology and position on cooperation with other parties 
(Parushev 2003). While the Roma NGO sector grew relatively quickly over the next 
few years, and partly because it did, Roma political mobilization was stunted. For the 
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most of the 1990s the only representation the Roma got was through the mainstream 
political parties. This was a very limited form of representation in which one or two 
Roma had a symbolic presence in Parliament during each term.4  According to 
Danova of the European Roma Rights Center:   
This practice proved to be a dead-end road for the 
representation of Roma in parliamentary politics. Not only it 
accounts for severe under-representation of Roma, but also 
makes their cause contingent on the policies of the majority 
parties, generally indifferent if not hostile to the aspirations 
of Roma. Again, this practice served best the majority politicians 
and the authorities who were provided with a shield against 
criticism that Roma were excluded from political life (Danova 
2001).   
                                                
4 Cooperation with the party of the Turkish minority, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS), 
seemed to be a natural choice for some of the Roma leaders. The argument that the two minorities 
faced common problems as well as the proclaimed desire of the DPS to defend the rights and of all 
people, minorities and individuals in Bulgaria made this an alluring possibility 
In 1994, Georgi Parushev, a leading Roma activist and DUR founder, campaigned for the DPS hoping 
to manage to get into Parliament though their lists, arguing that this was good way to use already 
existing structures to achieve political representation for the Roma (Tarashleva, 1994). However, he 
was unsuccessful. Cooperation between the two ethnic groups did not pick up again until the 2001 
elections.  
In the 2001 elections the DPS formed an electoral coalition with Evroroma, an important Roma 
organization in Bulgaria. MRF placed a number of Romani representatives on its ticket, all of them, 
however, at unelectably low positions. As a result, the MRF failed to ensure the election of a single 
Romani candidate in the 2001 elections (Illiev 2001). By 2003, the DPS discarded any possibility for 
future cooperation with the Roma party (Dal 2003)  
Cooperation with the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) has also been a common policy for the Roma 
political leaders and has been relatively welcome by the BSP leadership through most of the 1990s. 
The major argument behind this position is that the problems of the Roma are mostly of a nature that 
calls for a very active state involvement. Consequently, the Roma are on the left side of the political 
continuum and they naturally should support the major political actor on the left  the BSP  (Sega 
2002). The traditional link between the BSP (BCP before 1989) and some of the Roma socialist-time 
leaders has also facilitated this cooperation (Parushev 2003). However, this cooperation has been far 
from fair to the Roma minority. Although a couple of Roma leaders have achieved representation 
through the BSP over the years, the concern of the BSP, with the situation of the Roma minority has 
been minimal (Illiev 2001).  
The Union of Democratic Forces, as the major anti-communist political organization in Bulgaria, was 
also a natural partner for the new Roma political organizations in the early 1990s.  Manus Romanov 
the first Roma representative in Parliament after 1989 was elected on the UDF list.  However, for the 
rest of 1990s the UDF became notorious for disregarding Roma as possible partners during elections. 
(Iliev 2001)  Despite the fact that some of the Roma Leaders were openly pro-UDF, their loyalty bore 
no fruits (Mladenov 2003). While cooperation between the UDF and some Roma parties exists in 
some localities, there has been no major cooperation at national level.  
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It was not until 1997-1998 that Roma organizations again began to show 
genuine political ambition and to make the first steps towards organizing for elections 
(Mladenov 2003). Due to the constitutional ban Roma political organizations are 
either not registered as parties or have non-Roma specific names. Twenty one Roma 
political organization were founded between 1997 and 2003 in Bulgaria, including  
Free Bulgaria, Party for Social and Democratic Change (PSDC), Evroroma and  
Citizens Union Roma as the more visible and active ones.5  
The local elections in late 1999 were the first elections at which Roma parties  
competed in elections.  Free Bulgaria managed to get three Roma elected as mayors 
and place over 60 Roma as local councilors. The successful Roma participation led to 
quite high optimism about the upcoming parliamentary elections in 2001. The recent 
local elections indicate that there is a possibility that a Roma party may reach the 4% 
threshold and win seats in parliament in the next parliamentary election in 2001 
(ERRC 1999).  
However, the heterogeneity of the Roma population and infighting among the 
leaders prevented a unified Roma party from emerging despite numerous efforts of 
various NGOS and international organizations (OSCE among others) to encourage 
this. Two of the main parties Free Bulgaria and PSDC appeared in a coalition with 
six smaller organizations and parties at the 2001 elections. However, Evroroma chose 
to run in a coalition with the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, while Citizens 
                                                
5Free Bulgaria was originally led by Tzar Kiro  the self-proclaimed tsar of the Roma in Bulgaria and 
was established in 1997. It is currently led by his son, Prince Angel.  
ROS Kupate is an organization primarily concerned with the economic development of the Roma and 
has an ideology that is close to the democratic idea (i.e. the UDF). (Mladenov 2003) The 
organization s leader established the Party for Social and Democratic Change (PSDC) in 2000. 
In 1998, Tzvetelin Kunchev established Evroroma. Kunchev was elected to the National Assembly 
through the Bulgarian Business Black lists in 1997. By 2000, his immunity as member of Parliament 
was removed to allow the courts to prosecute him for several crimes.  
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Union Roma joined the BSP coalition.  At the 2001 elections, National Union Tzar 
Kiro, as the Roma coalition was called, got 27,000 votes or about 0.6% of the popular 
vote. Very few of the Roma in Bulgaria voted for the party although Roma 
participation in the elections is estimated at around d65% (UNDP). After this defeat 
the coalition perceived as a defeat, it fell apart (Mladenov 2003)  
[Table 5 about Here] 
At present, there are two Roma representatives in the Bulgarian Parliament. 
One elected through a coalition of his party with the BSP and one elected through the 
lists of NDSV. As the newest of the major Bulgarian parties NDSV (National 
Movement Simeon the Second) quickly adopted the policy common to the rest of the 
Bulgarian parties  it courted Roma voters before elections, nominated (and sent to 
Parliament) one representative, and assumed its job of representing the Roma to be 
done.  
The slim chance of even a unified Roma party to surpass the 4% threshold 
makes their coalition even more unlikely. Forming coalitions with one of the bigger 
parties and securing a few seats is a much better strategy from the point of view of the 
leaders of Roma parties.  While in early 2002 Tomov, leader of the Citizens Union 
Roma,  was quite optimistic about the future unification of the three Roma parties, by 
late 2002 he was actively campaigning for continuation of his cooperation with the 
BSP in light of the upcoming local elections in October 2003 (Tomov 20002, Sega 
2002). Both  Evroroma and PSDC participated on their own in the local elections, 
while Free Bulgaria did not run their own candidates, but supported various 
candidates depending on local circumstances (BTA 2003, Sega 2003). As of early 
3004 there are no plans for cooperation among the four. 
Ethnic Representation in Romania 
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Similar to the DPS in Bulgaria, the party of the ethnic Hungarians in Romania, 
the Hungarian Democratic Union (UDMR/RMDSZ) has had a substantial role in 
Romanian political life. As ethnic parties are not banned in Romania it has never had 
any problems with displaying its ethnic basis. It has also managed to preserve itself as 
the exclusive party of the Hungarian minority. Election results are provided in Table 
6. 
[Table 6 about Here] 
The UDMR has gained representation in all post 1989 Parliaments at a level 
that roughly corresponds to the Hungarian proportion of the population. In addition it 
has remained in many ways the only stable party in Romanian politics, besides the 
communist successor party in Romania. In addition, it was part of the governing 
coalitions from 1996 until 2000, a fact that many saw as a major step towards 
achieving ethnic harmony in Romania.  
As illustrated by Table 7, the UMDR support is also very highly encapsulated. 
Its membership to electorate ratio was about 65% in 1996, a level that is much higher 
than the DPS and any other party in the region as well. A large proportion of the 
Hungarian minority also voted for them, an important fact given how close the 
proportion of Hungarians in Romania is to the electoral threshold of the electoral 
system (Stroschein 2001).  
[Table 7 about Here] 
Overall, the UMDR has benefited from the provisions of Romania s PR 
system (as it could be hurt by a potential SMD system) but not from the positive 
discrimination system that exists for other minorities in the Romanian system. It can 
be argued that given the nature of the minority and the experience of the DPS in 
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Bulgaria, the UMDR would have done equally well under a typical PR system with 
no ethnic element.  
In fact, the demands of the UMDR have at times reached much more extreme 
levels than the ones of the DPS. It threatened to leave from the government coalitions 
in 1997 and 1998 if demands for state funded Hungarian university were not met 
and has repeatedly  called for some degree of autonomy for Hungarian-majority 
regions (Stroschein 2001, 61). This trend has been exacerbated with the internal split 
in the UDMR in 2003: its radical wing for territorial autonomy for Transylvania.  In 
contrast to the DPS, the UDMR has obviously not made any efforts to escape its 
ethnic nature. The higher degree of radicalization along ethnic lines might be 
attributed to the acceptance of ethnicity as a legitimate political cleavage in 
Romania s general legislation.  
The same feature, however, has allowed for the Roma in Romania to do much 
better in terms of political mobilization and representation in comparison to the Roma 
in Bulgaria. Roma parties have been running in elections from the very first 
democratic elections and one of them has gotten the guaranteed 1 seat in the 
legislature at every election.  
[Table 8 about Here] 
As of the last elections, two Roma representative were members of the 
Romanian Parliament, one through the reserved seat and one was elected on the lists 
of the ruling Party of Social Democracy (PSD). The Roma political activity has 
clearly been dominated by the Partida Rromilor, which now receives government 
subsidies, allowing it to further strengthen its network and better prepare for its next 
electoral campaign (Roma Rights 2003).  
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The Roma Parties in Romania seem to enjoy higher levels of support amongst 
the Roma minority than do Bulgarian Roma parties.   
[Table 9 about Here]  
About twice as big of a proportion of the Roma in Romania vote for the Roma 
parties, compared to Bulgaria; the percentage of the minority (of the total population) 
is four times as much as the vote share of the Roma parties (of total vote) in Romania; 
while the percentage of the minority is seven times as big the vote share of Roma 
parties in Bulgaria.  
However, the Romanian system of positive discrimination has 
underrepresented the Roma minority while overrepresented many others. The vote-
seat ratio for the Roma parties ranges 0.22 in 1996 to 0.48 in 1990, with 1 being 
perfect proportionality.  Electoral arrangements of the kind that exist in Poland (which 
allow ethnic parties to gain representation proportional to their vote no matter whether 
they have passed the electoral threshold or not) would have allowed for much stronger 
representation of the minority in the Romanian legislature. The level of re-
presentation of Roma parties in the Romanian Parliament is still however infinitely 
larger than the one of Roma parties in Bulgaria. 
Overall, the Romanian Roma parties have been able to gain much more 
visibility in the political life than the Roma parties in Bulgaria. While in terms of 
number of Roma in Parliament there is no significant difference between Bulgaria and 
Romania, the ability of the Romania Roma to achieve representation through their 
own parties has allowed them to gain more influence in Romanian politics.  For 
example, as a result of the pre-election agreement between the PSD, the winning party 
in the Romanian 2000 elections and Partida Romilor, the latter received as position in 
the state administration  undersecretary of state and Head of the National Office for 
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Roma; as well as one position as an advisor to the President of Romania. Partida 
Romilor also negotiated the appointment of Roma in the offices of regional and local 
governments throughout the country (NDI 2003a).   
Clearly, these achievements go well beyond what the Roma in Bulgaria have 
managed to achieve. In 1999, the Bulgarian Roma organizations drafted a Framework 
Program for the Equal Integration of Roma in Society  that outlined the problems of 
the Roma minority and the policies needed to resolve these. The framework was 
signed by the then current government, but neither it, not its successor have taken any 
concrete steps to implement it. While the very fact that the Framework was agreed 
upon was a major achievement for the Roma minority, nothing seems to have come 
out of it (NDI 2003b). Overall, it seems that even the token representation of Roma 
ethnic parties in the legislature can make a difference when compared to token 
representation of Roma leaders only.  
Consequences for Minority Political Representation 
The final question that this paper addresses is whether having Roma parties in 
Parliament elected on their own terms has had any effect on the political attitudes of 
the Roma minority in Romania. For this purpose, the paper presents data from the 
2001 Survey of Roma in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and the Czech and the Slovak 
Republics carried out by the UNDP (UNDP 2001). I report data on several indicators 
of political participation: voter turnout, trust in a Roma or any political party; and 
feelings of being represented in the government and compare the trends among the 
Bulgarian and Romanian Roma. Results are presented in Table 10.  
Roma in both Bulgaria and Romania exhibit high involvement in the electoral 
process  in both countries the voter turnout for the Roma is just around or above the 
national turnout rate for this particular election, a fact that is curious given the low 
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education level and economic status of the Roma in society. However, the voter 
turnout of Romanian Roma is markedly higher than the one of the Roma in Bulgaria 
a difference of about 14 percent. Although it might be a stretch to attribute this to the 
presence of Roma parties in Parliament, the temptation is there.  
Further, Romanian Roma exhibit a substantially higher familiarity and trust in 
their own political parties. About 27 percent can name a Roma party they trust in 
Romania, while only about 5% of the Bulgarian Roma can do the same. The contrast 
is even more striking when we compare these figures to the percentage of Roma who 
could name any other party that would trust. About the same number of Roma in 
Romania could do so  a little bit over 28%, while the number of Roma who would 
name a trusted party in Bulgaria was more than three times more than the number of 
people who could name a trusted Roma party. The results clearly indicate a much 
higher familiarity with Roma parties at similar level of general familiarity with 
political parties. When asked directly about the source of support for the Roma in 
their country, Roma in Romania indicated they can rely on the Roma parties at an 
almost twice as higher rate than the Bulgarian Roma.  Intriguingly, the Romanian 
Roma also exhibit much lower rates of relying on the state to support them.  
However, the difference in familiarity with Roma parties might be an artifact 
of the fact that there have been many more Roma parties in Romania and they have 
been much more active over the years than their counterparts in Bulgaria. A more 
interesting question is, is there a difference of how Roma feel about the political 
process in general.  Regretfully there is only one survey question that taps into the 
efficacy of the Roma. Based on the answers to the question Do you feel your 
interests are well represented (at different levels of government)?  Romanian Roma 
show much higher levels of satisfaction with the way their interests are represented at 
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all levels of government.  The active presence or absence of Roma parties in the 
political system thus does seem to make a difference for the political attitudes and 
behavior of the Roma minority in Bulgaria and Romania, thus lending support to the 
original propositions of consociational theory and the advocates for having ethnic 
parties.  
Conclusion 
While the constitutional ban of ethnic parties in Bulgaria has not hurt the 
Turkish minority, it seems to have at least originally impeded the development of 
Roma political parties. In addition, the absence of any positive discrimination with 
respect to ethnic minorities as well as the 4% threshold needed to gain representation 
have further prevented the Roma of Bulgaria with sending their own representatives 
to Parliament. 
In Romania, the arrangements of positive discrimination do not appear to have 
made much of a difference for the electoral fate of the Hungarian minority party, but 
has influenced the development of Roma parties. Electoral arrangements thus seem to 
matter, but to mostly do so in situations where other factors of political mobilization 
seem to make representation uncertain.  The effect of electoral arrangements on the 
success of ethnic parties is clearly mitigated by the size and dynamics of the minority 
they represent. 
Although the findings are clearly in need of further investigation, the 
differences in political attitudes and behavior between Bulgarian and Romanian Roma 
lend some support to the hypothesis that electoral rules can influence the nature of 
politics in a country. Going back to the original discussion, the logic behind the theory 
of consociationalism is that electoral rules will influence the chance of small parties, 
including ethnic ones, to gain representation in the legislature, which would in turn 
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lead to greater support for the political system on behalf of the minority (Norris 
2004). At least for the case of the small parties of the Roma minority in Romania and 
Bulgaria this seems to be the case.  
Finally, the ethnicization of political conflict might have created more radical 
nationalism in the case of the Romanian Hungarians than the officially non-ethnic 
representation of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. While DPS policy positions have 
been moderated over the 1990s, the ones of the UMDR seem to have gotten more 
radical. Thus, the present discussion seems to contribute little to a definitive answer of 
the debate on the desirability of ethnic parties. Instead, the discussion indicates that 
the effect of the ethnicization of politics on the political development of any state will 
depend on several additional factors.  
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Tables
 
Table 1: Minority Groups in Bulgaria  
Ethnic Group Size of 
Minority 
Percentage of 
Total 
Population 
Turks 746 664 9.42% 
Roma 370 908 4.68%9 
Russians 15 595 0.20% 
Armenians 10 832 0.14% 
Vlachs 10 566 0.13% 
Others 29 722 0.38% 
Source: National Statistical Institute, Official Census of the Republic of Bulgaria, 
2001. Available at http://www.nsi.bg/Census/Ethnos.htm (in Bulgarian)   
Table 2: Minorities in Romania  
Ethnic Group Size of 
Minority 
Percentage of 
Total 
Population 
Hungarians  1,434,377   6.6 % 
Roma      535,250   2.5 % 
Germans        60,088   0.28 % 
Ukrainians        61,091   0.28 % 
Russians        36,397   0.17 % 
Turks        32,596   0.15 % 
Tatars        24,137        0.11 % 
Serbs        22,518   0.10 % 
Source: Alionescu, Ciprian-Calin. 2003.  
http://www.psa.ac.uk/cps/2003/Ciprian%20Alionescu.pdf
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Table 3: Political Parties in Bulgaria, Percentage of the Popular Vote, 1990, 
1991, 1994, 1997 and 2001elections  
Party  1990 1991 1994 1997 2001 
Coalition for Bulgaria/BSP and Coalition 47.2 33.1 43.5 22.5 17.1 
Union of Democratic Forces /ODS 36.2 34.4 24.2 53.2 18.2 
Bulgarian Agrarian National Union 8.0 3.9 6.5 - - 
Movement for Rights & Freedoms/as 
ONS in 1997 
6.0 7.5 5.4 7.7 7.5 
Bulgarian Business Block - 1.3 4.7 5.0 0.0 
Euroleft - - - 5.6 1.0 
National Movement Simeon the Second - - - - 42.7 
Source: Richard Rose and Neil Munro, Elections and Parties in New European 
Democracies, available at the CSPP website, http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/
  
Table 4: Encapsulation of the DPS voters and the Turkish Minority, 2001 
elections  
DPS Members 2001-2002 58,000  
As percent of the voters 16.93% 
As percent of the minority 7.77% 
Votes for the DPS in 2001 340,395 
As percent of minority 45% 
As percent of total vote 7.5% 
Size of the Turkish 
Minority 
746, 664  
As percent of total 
population 
9.42% 
Sources:  National Statistical Institute, Official Census of the Republic of Bulgaria, 
2001. Available at http://www.nsi.bg/Census/Ethnos.htm (in Bulgarian);  
Richard Rose and Neil Munro, Elections and Parties in New European Democracies, 
available at the CSPP website, http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/
Membership data from Dal 2003.  
Table 5: Encapsulation of the Roma parties support and the Roma minority, 
2001 elections 
Votes for the Coalition 
Tzar Kiro in 2001 
27, 000  
As percent of the minority 7.27 % 
As percent of total vote 0.6%  
Size of the Roma  Minority 370 908 
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As percent of total 
population 
4.67% 
Sources:  
National Statistical Institute, Official Census of the Republic of Bulgaria, 2001. 
Available at http://www.nsi.bg/Census/Ethnos.htm (in Bulgarian);  
Richard Rose and Neil Munro, Elections and Parties in New European Democracies, 
available at the CSPP website, http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/
 
Table 6: Political Parties in Romania, Percentage of the Popular Vote, 1990, 
1992, 1996 and 2000 elections  
Party  1990 1992 1996 2000 
National Salvation Front/ Democratic 
National Salvation Front/PDSR 
66.3 27.7 21.5 36.6 
Hungarian Democratic Union 7.2 7.5 6.6 6.8 
National Liberal Party -Campeanu 6.4 2.6 - 1.4 
Democratic Convention of Romania  - 20.0 30.2 5.0 
Democratic Party - NSF - 10.2 - 7.0 
Romanian National Unity Party - 7.7 4.4 1.4 
Greater Romania Party - 3.9 4.5 19.5 
Social Democratic Union - - 12.9 - 
National Liberal Party  - - 1.6 6.9 
Others 7.2 10.5 10.7 8.8 
Source:  
Richard Rose and Neil Munro, Elections and Parties in New European Democracies, 
available at the CSPP website, http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/
 
Table 7: Encapsulation of the UMDR support, 1996  
UMDR Members 1995 533,000 
As percent of its voters 65% 
As percent of the minority 37% 
Votes for the UMDR in 
1996 
812,628 
As percent of the minority 56% 
As percent of total vote 7.5% 
Size of the Hungarian 
minority 
1,434,377 
As percent of total 
population 
6.6% 
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Sources: Michael Shafir, The Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania in 
Stein; Richard Rose and Neil Munro, Elections and Parties in New European 
Democracies, available at the CSPP website, http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/; and 
Alionescu, Ciprian-Calin. 2003.  
http://www.psa.ac.uk/cps/2003/Ciprian%20Alionescu.pdf
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Table 8: Roma Parties in Romania, 1990-2000  
Year  Party  Number 
of Votes 
Percent 
Vote 
Seats Percent 
Seats  
Democratic Union of the Roma of 
Romania (Uniunea Democrata a Romilor 
din Romania) 
29162 0.21 1 0.25 
Party of the Gypsies of Romania (Partidul 
Tiganilor din Romania) 
16865 0.12 0 0 
United Democratic Party of the Roma 
Woodworkers and Fiddlers in Romania 
(Partidul Unit Democrat al Romilor, 
Rudarilor,si Lautarilor din Romania) 
21847 0.16 0 0 
Free Democratic Union of Roma in Romania 
(Uniunea Libera Democratica a Romilor din 
Romania) 
4605 0.03 0 0 
1990 
Total 72479 0.52 1 0.25 
Roma Party (Partida Romilor) 52704 0.48 1 0.29 
Free Democratic Union of the Roma in 
Romania (Uniunea Libera Democratica a 
Romilor din Romania) 
31384 0.29 0 0 
Party of Gypsies in Romania (Partidul 
Tiganilor din Romania) 
9949 0.09 0 0 
1992 
Total  94037 0.86 1 0.29 
Roma Party (Partida Romilor) 82195 0.67 1 0.29 
Roma Union (Uniunea Romilor) 71020 0.58 0 0 
Community of the Roma Ethnicity in 
Romania (Comunitatea Etniei Rromilor din 
Romania) 
5227 0.04 0 0 
1996  
Union of the Roma, Constanta County 
(Uniunea Rromilor Judetul Constanta) 
640 0.01 0 0 
Total  159082 1.3 1 0.29 
PRr - Roma Party (Partida Rromilor) 71786 0.63 1 0.29 
CCRR - Christian Centre of the Rroma in 
Romania (Centrul Crestin al Romilor din 
Romania) 
12171 0.11 0 0 
2000 
Total 83957 0.74 1 0.29 
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Source: Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist 
Europe 
http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/indexCountry.asp?country=ROMANIA&opt=
elc/   
Table 9: Encapsulation of the Roma Party support, 2000 elections  
Votes for the Partida 
Rromilor 
71786 
As percent of the minority 15.6% 
As percent of total vote 0.63%  
Size of the Roma  Minority 535 250 
As percent of total 
population 
2.5% 
Sources: Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist 
Europe 
http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/indexCountry.asp?country=ROMANIA&opt=
elc/; and Alionescu, Ciprian-Calin. 2003.  
http://www.psa.ac.uk/cps/2003/Ciprian%20Alionescu.pdf
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Table 10: Some indicators of the Roma minority political pre-dispositions:  
Voter Turnout for the Roma  Minority in the 2001 elections in 
Bulgaria and the 2000 elections in Romania 
Country 
Bulgaria Romania  
Voted 65.8 % 80.12 % 
Did not Vote  33.7 %  16.28 % 
N/r 0.5 % 3.6 % 
Voter turnout for the 
whole country (aggregate 
results):  66.77 % 65% 
Could you name a Roma political party you would trust? 
Country 
Bulgaria Romania  
Indicated 5.52% 27.07% 
Don't know 94.48% 72.93% 
Could you name some other political party you would trust? 
Country 
Bulgaria Romania  
Indicated 18.46% 28.37% 
Don't know 81.54% 71.63% 
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On whom can Roma in your country rely for support? Percent of 
people who answered yes to each category. 
Country 
Bulgaria Romania  
Roma parties 19.86 35.66 
Roma NGOs 20.36 12.69 
Informal Roma leaders 13.54 29.07 
Well-off or Rich Roma 
individuals 18.56 11.99 
Neighbors and friends 
from the majority 35.31 18.98 
Roma neighbors and 
friends 46.74 29.37 
Non-Roma NGOs with 
human rights profile 11.53 18.08 
The government itself 42.73 21.28 
Foreign 
donors/institutions 29.59 13.29 
Do you think your interests are represented well enough? Percent of 
Roma who answered Yes
Country 
Bulgaria Romania  
At national level 7.82 % 18.18 % 
At municipal level 12.74 % 16.68 % 
At the level of the 
community 14.14 % 33.47 % 
Source: UNDP, 2002. Avoiding the Dependency Trap, Regional Data Set 
http://roma.undp.sk/; general voter turnout from http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/
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